

5/9/75

Mr. Roger Fineman
CBS News-Radio
524 W 57 St.,
New York, N.Y. 10019

Dear Roger,

I found the Dan Schorr Oswald sequence on tonight's TV news interesting in a number of ways. Mostly because it was reported

I regard it as a welcome change, one long overdue, in the reporting on this subject. My presumption is that in the course of following up on my work when sources were consulted they came up with this.

Those sources really came up with nothing new except the documents. Those I don't have and if copies are no problem, I'd like to have them for archival value and for my own reading.

I have had that part of the story for some time. Actually, except for the documents, it is publicly available. My information has all been published and ignored.

How I came onto it fascinates me and may you. I had not read Nosenko's book. There came a time when I started getting mysterious calls from a man with a heavy Russian accent, like a Russian who had learned English in Russia, from an American-educated instructor, and had not been here very long.

Finally, after hours of conversation, we worked out a meeting half way between here and where he said he lives, in a public place, with Whitewash IV the identification. He came up to me while I was shopping. We then lunched together. And I've heard not a word from him since. He went by a first name only and I called him by that.

If I were to guess I'd say that the CIA brought him here and he is less than completely happy or wants to give that impression.

I made no effort to break his cover, none to even see his car. If he does not want me to know who he is, I'm satisfied with that. He has his rights as well as his own problems.

He is not without familiarity with intelligence. One of the possibilities that struck me is that he was giving me this information on behalf of another because what Nosenko really said is not precisely what I'd believe this man thinks.

Also interesting, it correlates with a time I was negotiating with the CIA for access ^{to} ~~on~~ their files on me.

I presume it is not impossible that there may be sequences from time to time that may be considered for use in the coming special. I will, therefore, on the chance that what I observe may be of interest later, start a file of suggestions.

This one will deal with the McCone part of that sequence.

No answer required,

Harold Weisberg

P.S. By this time next week I expect photographic proof of some of the new materials I discussed with you. This means not new proofs, I have them. In photographic form.

McCone's explanation of the CIA's not giving the Warren Commission Nosenko's report that the KGB considered Oswald a U.S. agent is that Nosenko had not been tested and his information therefore was not authenticated.

There are several reasons this is irrelevant.

All the executive session transcripts dealing with this question reflect the Commission's certainty that the agencies would lie to them or deceive them. Dulles could not have been more explicit about the CIA and the FBI. Rankin could not have been any more explicit about the FBI alone.

So, assuming the Commission's seriousness of purpose, an entirely unwarranted assumption, it required every rumor no matter how wild that in any way addressed the question.

Most of the investigation consisted of alleged checking out of the irrelevant.

Hoover - and Scheparr showed FBI reports* did an entire section of "Rumors and Speculations" that was used in the report. The Commission did have this report, it did deal with rumors it considered worthless (with Hoover as selector-decider) and Rankin laid out the Commission's job with that rumor to be wiping it out, not investigating. So, wiping out that dirty rumor is the task the Commission set for itself. With any basis not to believe Nosenko's report it was exactly what the Commission and the FBI and CIA needed.

On the other hand, if there were any basis for Nosenko's report, especially with the vast FBI inspired campaign to label Oswald as a Red, then the Commission certainly required it and it was the Commission's, not the CIA's or FBI's job to determine validity.

To put this another way, the only reasonable interpretation of the failure to give the Nosenko report to the Commission is that the agencies did not believe it to be false or untrustworthy.

Each knew its own people. If each had no concern, then each agency had a great vested interest in disproving the Nosenko report.

Another possible reason for both agencies' withholding of this Nosenko report is that neither wanted to end the the-Reds-did-it propaganda that gave all the other official fictions a semblance of credibility. Nosenko said the Russians did not trust Oswald, believed he was an agent, and were ousting him until he slashed his wrist. If they don't trust him, how can he be theirs?

Almost all of Hoover's file designations in this case are under Oswald and Russia, with no reason for Russia or the also common Cuba. He began that way. He was not about to junk one of his best bits of propaganda, propaganda that extended even to his file designations.

Defectors were handled by the CIA division that also handled CIA relations with the Warren Commission-Angleton's. Most of it was through a man who resigned with Angleton, Raymond Rocco. But Hoover had no complication like McCone claims, having to authenticate Nosenko first. Hoover did most of the Commission's investigating. It is unlikely that an agent in Russia could be Hoover's. So his failure to pass this on could not be because he suspected it was one of his boys.

However, this knowledge could have been of use to Hoover after Oswald returned. For Hoover's, not Commission purposes. It made blackmailing Oswald easy. Automatic.

Another and simpler view is that nothing McCone said is sensible except as still another coverup. He gave no reason for not letting the Commission know but he got this impression across, that telling the Commission would have been wrong.